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IMPRESSIONS OF REFLECTION AND THE END OF ART:




In his 'Of the Standard of Taste' David Hume seems to make the paradoxical claim that
even though the sentiments an agent feels in response to an artwork are subjective and
unique, and it cannot be said that such sentiments are either correct or incorrect, there is a
standard upon which art can be judged, which is at least partly determined by these
sentiments.  On first approximation, this claim seems problematic because it appears to
assume that sentiments both have and do not have normative weight.  What I mean by
this is that, if a sentiment has normative weight, then the relationship it shares with an
artwork will be one of evaluation or judgment.  As Hume has it, good art ought to cause
pleasant sentiments.  This assumption can be seen in his discussion of the pleasure of
poetry, which he attributes to the correct use of the rules of composition.  'If some
negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not pleased by their transgressions
of rule or order, but in spite of these transgressions; They have possessed other beauties,
which were conformable to just criticism….' (SoT, 353)  Only praiseworthy aspects of an
artwork will cause pleasure.   From this we can infer that causing a pleasant sentiment is
a reason to praise an artwork.
Hume seems to defend the non-normativity of sentiments by claiming that sentiments
are non-representational feelings impressed upon an agent.  Since they neither are
intentionally created by the agent, nor do they represent the art work in any way, they do
not seem fit for judging that artwork.  Nonetheless, Hume also argues that the authority of
any given judgment of an artwork is rooted in sentiment.
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In order to explicate the apparent contradiction, Hume’s assumptions can be
formulated as an inconsistent triad: (1) aesthetic responses, which are of a type that Hume
calls sentiments, are non-representational feelings and so can be neither true nor false; (2)
some evaluations of an artwork are more correct than others because they require
understanding the work in ways that can be more or less informed and precise; and (3)
the benchmark used to determine the worth of an artwork is the consensus of sentiments
of those who understand the artwork properly.  The conjunction of the second and third
assumptions makes it seem as if one’s sentiments are caused by one’s understanding, and
therefore represent that understanding in ways that can be more or less correct.  This
conclusion, however, contradicts the first assumption.
I will demonstrate that the apparent contradiction can be resolved if one accounts for a
distinction Hume makes in the Treatise between impressions of sensation and reflection.
Sentiments fall into the latter category.  Both types of impressions are feelings, but
whereas the former are unmediated responses, the latter are triggered by reflection.  This
is not to say that sentiments represent the understanding, but only that they are impressed
upon an agent after she has reflected.  What Hume means to claim is that an agent who
reflects properly  experiences different sentiments than an agent who has not.  The
standard of taste is, thereby, determined by the consensus of those who have reflected
properly.  To jump to this conclusion, however, is to put the cart before the horse, and so
let me return to the allegedly inconsistent triad.
2. Tension
Hume’s first two assumptions rest on the intuition that perceptual engagement with art
has both a passive and an active faculty: sentiment and reflection.  Affective sentiments
do not seem to carry normative weight, but the understanding that results from reflection
does.
All sentiment is right because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real,
whenever a man is conscious of it.  But all determinations of the understanding are not right;
because they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matters of fact…. (SoT,
352)
Sentiments, unlike determinations of the understanding (viz. belief), are not truth
functional because they are not propositions which purport to represent some fact.  When
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Hume says that 'all sentiment is right,' he means something more along the lines of no
sentiment can be wrong.  They are affective experiences that represent nothing and can
therefore be neither true nor false. Belief differs from sentiment, because it  represents an
object, and its veracity depends on whether it correctly represents or misrepresents that
object.
For Hume, it is not enough to say that aesthetic evaluation is only a matter of
understanding.  He seems to switch gears and defend the normativity of sentiment when
he claims that sentiments themselves can be evaluated according to how well they concur
with the standard.  'It is natural for us to seek a standard of taste; a rule by which the
various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least a decision, afforded, confirming
one sentiment and condemning another.' (SoT, 352)  Judgments are based on sentiments,
and some judgments are more correct than others.  At the very least, the authority for
such a judgment comes from the consensus of sentiments amongst several qualified
observers.
Some observers’ sentiments do not meet with the standard because they lack the
qualities of a true judge.
But though all the general rules of art are founded only on experience and on the observation of the
common sentiments of human nature, we must not imagine, that, on every occasion, the feelings of
men will be conformable to these rules.  Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and
delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make them play
with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles.' (SoT, 353)
The same work of art will cause the same sentiments in different judges only when there
is the concurrence of favourable circumstances: 'Strong sense, united to delicate
sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice.'
(SoT, 360)  A strong sense impresses sentiment more vivaciously than a weak sense.  A
delicate taste discerns components in a work of art.  '[Delicacy of taste] is acknowledged
to be the perfection of every sense or faculty, to perceive with exactness its most minute
objects, and allow nothing to escape its notice and observation.' (SoT, 356)  Practice
distinguishes which sentiments are evoked by which components.  'The several
perfections and defects seem wrapped up in a species of confusion, and present
themselves indistinctly to the imagination.' (SoT, 357)  Practice clears up this confusion.
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Comparison makes one aware of the magnitude of the spectrum of beauty.  'It is
impossible to continue in the practice of contemplating any order of beauty, without
being frequently obliged to form comparisons between the several species and degrees of
excellence, and estimating their proportion to each other.' (SoT, 357)  Lack of prejudice
insures that one’s understanding is not corrupted in some way, such as by one’s own
social context.  'We may observe, that every work of art, in order to produce its due effect
on the mind . . . must be surveyed in a certain point of view, and cannot be fully relished
by persons, whose situation . . . is not conformable to that which is required by the
performance.' (SoT, 358)  Hume advises that a judge 'forget, if possible, [his] individual
being and [his] peculiar circumstance.' (SoT, 358)
The qualification of a potential judge can be empirically determined.  One can prove
that one has experience with art and lacks prejudice easily enough.  It is more difficult,
however, to convince others of the delicacy of one’s taste and strong sense.  Nonetheless,
Hume asserts that this can be done with a test.  He uses a passage from Cervantes’ Don
Quixote as an example of what such a test might look like.  Two of Sancho Panza’s
kinsmen, when asked to give an opinion of a certain vintage of wine, both claim that it is
good.  However, one tastes leather and the other tastes iron. When the hogshead is
emptied, an iron key on a leather thong is found. (SoT, 355)  From this we are supposed
to conclude that Sancho’s kinsmen possess a more delicate taste than anyone else present,
and that their opinions are therefore more valuable.
This leads us to the third part of the inconsistent triad.  If a judge is qualified, then he
will experience the same sentiments as other qualified judges. But sentiments are not
supposed to carry normative weight.  How could they be a measure for any standard?
The fact that there is often consensus of sentiment amongst those who have valuable
opinions, suggests that there is a standard of taste.  Hume can mean one of two things by
this line of thought.  Either there are incorrect sentiments or else sentiments are a product
of proper understanding.  The former blatantly contradicts the first part of the inconsistent
triad.  Hume does not mean to say the correct sentiment makes the true judge, but rather
that true judges experience the correct sentiment because they have the proper sensitivity
and training, all of which aid their understanding.
It is precisely this thought that leads Noel Carroll to worry that,
GARY JAEGER
29
The more that understanding and interpretive reasoning are required before the right sentiment can
be caused, the less persuasive it is to think that the process of aesthetic response is essentially a
causal one, modelled on the notion of an unmediated perception, such as the tremor of sweetness
that shocks the palate when a piece of sugar touches the tongue. (Carroll, 186)
The experience of tasting sweetness, however, can only be analogised to an impression of
sensation and not a complete aesthetic response including reflective sentiments.  If,
however, Hume means that sentiment is the product of the understanding, then he seems
to be contradicting the claim he makes in other places that 'reason is and ought only to be
the slave of the passions.' (T, 415)  One’s cognitive faculties cannot bring the appropriate
sentiment into existence on their own accord.  One cannot force oneself to feel pleasure at
the sight of Sistine Chapel, for example, simply because one knows that it is considered
to be a masterpiece.
3. Resolution
In order to make sense of Hume’s claims, we need to distinguish sentiment from
impressions of sensation, and then we need to explain how the understanding can
influence a sentiment in a way that is not a deliberate creation of it.  Hume draws a
distinction in the Treatise between primary impressions caused by sensation and
secondary impressions caused by reflection.
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise
in the soul from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of
objects to the external organs.  Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some
of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. (T, 275)
When Hume claims that secondary impression proceed by the interposition of ideas, it
seems as if one’s reasoning, belief, or understanding is actively creating the sentiment in
the agent.  Hume, however, makes it clear that this cannot be the case when he writes,
'impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. . . nothing can oppose or retard
the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse.' (T, 413)  Hume simply means that ideas
are temporally prior to sentiments, and that sentiments respond to ideas without being
deliberately created by them.
In order to further elucidate the role understanding plays in Hume's understanding of
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sentiment, a clearer notion of  how understanding plays into aesthetic evaluation is in
order.  The moment in 'Of the Standard of Taste' where Hume locates aesthetic evaluation
in something other than sentiment is when he claims, 'Every work of art has also a certain
end or purpose, for which it is calculated; and it is to be deemed more or less perfect, as it
is more or less fitted to attain this end.' (SoT, 359)  One must realize an artwork’s end or
purpose in order to successfully evaluate it.  One could not, for example, credibly
condemn a tragedy for failing to make one laugh.  Only a judge with strong sense and
delicacy of taste will discriminate all of the components of an artwork and experience the
corresponding sensory impressions.  Practice and comparison will allow one to
understand how those components fit together to produce an effect that is comparable to
other artworks.
Accounting for two sets of impressions as well as reflection results in a slight
reformulation of Hume’s account in 'On the Standard of Taste.'  Evaluation must be
redefined so that it is not only a matter of sensation and feeling, but must also include
reflecting on impressions of sensation.  By this revised account, we can conclude that the
end of all praiseworthy art is to produce impressions, and that what makes a true judge
adequate is his ability to frame those impressions in a greater understanding of the
artwork’s purpose or end.
We are now in a position where we can envisage a working model for the process of
successful evaluation.  It is a process that includes both passive sensation and active
reflection.  Primary impressions are little more than an immediate response to a work of
art.  During active reflection, one’s reason correlates the artwork’s components with the
impressions, allowing the observer to develop an understanding of his passions in the
context of their correlative components and their relation to the work’s end.  Sentiment is
a secondary impression, a type of appreciation. Understanding is necessary for the
production of appreciation, but it does not create it.  Rather, appreciation is a passive
response that is impressed upon the observer without his control.
In light of this re-evaluation, we can resolve the alleged inconsistency.  It is the case
that: (1) all sentiment is correct because sentiment does not refer to anything beyond
itself; (2) Some sentiments are more correct than others because they are triggered by
(but do not represent) precise judgment, which links an artwork’s components to the
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impressions they evoke and evaluates the efficacy of each component in producing an
impression; and (3) if  judgment is precise enough, then the same work of art will cause
the same sentiment of appreciation in different judges, even if those judges had originally
experienced different primary impressions.  Therefore, a sentiment itself does not carry
normative weight.  It is an indication of an artwork’s worth, but the source of normative
authority is located in the understanding that led to the sentiment.1
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